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Movements, Moments, and the Eroding 
Antitrust Consensus 
Michael Wolfe*† 
Timothy Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New  
Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports, 2018). $14.99. 
Timothy Wu’s book, The Curse of Bigness, offers a brief his-
tory on and critical perspective of antitrust law’s development over 
the last century, calling for a return to a Brandeisian approach to 
the law. In this review-essay, I use Wu’s text as a starting point to 
explore antitrust law’s current political moment. Tracing the  
dynamics at play in this debate and Wu’s role in it, I note areas 
underexplored in Wu’s text regarding the interplay of antitrust law 
with other forms of industrial regulation, highlighting in particular 
current difficulties in copyright law as one of the underlying ten-
sions driving popular discontent with the major technology firms 
or “tech trusts.” I consider the continuing influence of Robert 
Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, now more than forty years old, and 
how the current reform movement might execute a shift as lasting 
and substantial as the one Bork spearheaded with his book. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Portlandia—the IFC comedy series that, in a series of inter-
connected vignettes, lampoons the city of Portland, Oregon, and its 
reputation for what we might call “hipsterism”—has a few key 
gags.1 In its opening episode, one Angeleno pitches another about 
Portland’s virtues, proclaiming in song that “the dream of the ‘90s 
is alive in Portland.”2 This sentiment refers largely to the counter-
cultural trends and Gen X-ish aesthetics that are, in all fairness, 
characteristic of the place.3 Later in the series, however, the song is 
modified: “the dream of the ‘90s is alive in Portland—it’s the 
dream of the 1890s.”4 In Portlandia, the dream of the 1890s is 
pickling, bread baking, sewing—the “hipster” resurrection of a 
particular DIY ethos and aesthetic in a society that has largely  
replaced the daily practice of these kinds of activities with the con-
veniences of consumer capitalism.5 
We may only have hints about what Portlandia’s beard-
sporting, meat-curing, graphophone-listening retrophiles think 
about competition policy.6 Yet it is, in part, their image and pre-
ferred decade that are being conjured up when portions of the anti-
trust academy and bar use “hipster antitrust” to describe both a  
resurgence of Brandeisian enthusiasm for trust busting and a rejec-
 
1 See generally Portlandia (IFC television broadcast). 
2 Portlandia: Farm (IFC television broadcast Jan. 21, 2011); see IFC, Dream of the 
‘90s | Portlandia | IFC, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
U4hShMEk1Ew [https://perma.cc/386W-V5PE]. 
3 Id. 
4 Portlandia: Cops Redesign (IFC television broadcast Feb. 3, 2012); see Constantin 
Constantin, Portlandia—Dream of the 1890s, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_HGqPGp9iY [https://perma.cc/V54Q-4F5M]. 
5 Id. 
6 Although we do get glimpses in one exchange: 
Jason (Fred Armisen): Remember in the 1890s when the economy 
was in a tailspin; unwashed young men roamed the streets looking for 
work, and people turned their backs on huge corporate monopolies 
and supported local businesses? 
Melanie (Carrie Brownstein): I thought we had to support 
corporations—I thought they were too big to fail. 
Jason: Well, in Portland, people raise their own chickens, and cure 
their own meats. 
Id. 
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tion of the consumer welfare standard as antitrust law’s lodestar.7 
“Antitrust hipsterism,” goes the apparent first invocation of the 
phrase.8 “Everything old is cool again.”9 
Unsurprisingly, the label has proven sticky. “Hipster antitrust” 
is an impressively well-coined moniker: it is tight, memorable, and 
sounds as if it conveys something immediately understandable 
about its target, even if the specifics of what that something might 
be are stubbornly opaque.10  “Hipster” on its own is a peculiar 
word, combining in its modern usage an extreme malleability  
with an uncanny specificity.11 Hipsterdom is helplessly paradoxi-
cal: hipsters are either johnny-come-latelys, or else they are trend-
setters; the term refers to the artisanal, but also the manufactured 
appearance of artisanality; bohemianness and bourgeoisity; the 
sleekly modern and the anachronistically old-timey; the con-
sumerist and the DIY; the edgy and the tired. It makes sense, then, 
that the word can be used both to insult and to praise—a duality 
that is complicated, of course, by the fact that a hipster loathes 
above all else to be called a hipster. 12  Finally, and perhaps  
most significantly, hipsterdom also signifies youth, and the word  
is often used in the dismissal of youth and particularly of  
 
7 See Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and 
Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 293–95 (2019); see also 
Konstantin Medvedovsky, Hipster Antitrust—A Brief Fling or Something More, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/hipster-antitrust-a-brief-fling-or-something-more/# [https://perma.cc/W8AN-
MVVH] (subscription pay wall). 
8 Kostya Medvedovsky (@kmedved), TWITTER (June 28, 2017, 2:28 PM), 
https://twitter.com/kmedved/status/876869328934711296?s=20 [https://perma.cc/3BPH-
AHSH] (“Antitrust hipsterism. Everything old is cool again.”). 
9 Id. 
10 See Ico Maly & Piia Varis, The 21st-Century Hipster: On Micro-Populations in 
Times of Superdiversity, EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD., Aug. 2015, at 1, 3, 10 (“[T]he notion 
‘hipster’ itself is rarely clearly defined—it seems to be used as if its meaning was 
universally fixed and transparent, while in reality its meaning is opaque and fluid.”). 
11 Id. 
12 See Robert Horning, The Death of the Hipster, in N+1 FOUNDATION ET AL., WHAT 
WAS THE HIPSTER?: A SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 80–81 (2010) (“If you are 
concerned enough about the phenomenon to analyse it and discuss it, you are already 
somewhere on the continuum of hipsterism and are in the process of trying to rid yourself 
of its ‘taint.’”). 
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the not-necessarily-still-so-young millennial generation.13 Never-
theless, these people—hipsters—read as young and underem-
ployed, and they probably have an unprecedented and financially 
irresponsible enthusiasm for avocados. 
It is disorienting to have a term that can intelligibly capture an 
observed phenomenon—we will both somehow understand at least 
some of what you mean when you tell me you know a good  
“hipster coffee shop”14—while still so ably evading coherent defi-
nition. So, what can we make of the meaning of “hipster” in  
“hipster antitrust”? Ultimately, the word really tells us next to 
nothing about the substance of the movement. Nevertheless, the 
word still manages to convey substantial information about the 
politics implicated in the “hipster antitrust” paradigm—the sharp 
impression is that those who employ the phrase believe that trend-
setting, young johnny-come-latelies are peddling an edgy approach 
to antitrust that is also tired. Without a doubt, this phrase is an  
insult.15 Indeed, George Mason University’s Joshua Wright, who 
has been the most enthusiastic popularizer of “hipster antitrust,” 
acknowledges this phrase’s effectiveness as an insult, even as he 
insists that it remains the most appropriate name for the movement: 
[In response to the name] some were even offended, 
insisting that the movement be called the New 
Brandeis School or New Progressive Antitrust 
Movement. With all due respect to those associated 
with this movement . . . we adopt the term Hipster 
Antitrust here rather than the less well-known  
alternatives.16 
This is schoolyard-level insult reasoning—“look, snotnose, if you 
didn’t want to be called snotnose, why are so many people calling 
you snotnose?” Yet, whatever the logic behind it, the attraction for 
the name is holding. In fact, it is entirely possible that without 
 
13 Maly & Varis, supra note 10, at 3 (“Hipsters are a subculture of men and women 
typically in their 20’s and 30’s that value independent thinking, counter-culture, 
progressive politics, an appreciation of art and indie-rock, creativity, intelligence, and 
witty banter.”). 
14 Id. at 13. 
15 Wright et al., supra note 7, at 295. 
16 Id. 
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“hipster antitrust” (the naming phenomenon), “hipster antitrust” 
(the movement it describes) would have less momentum, appeal, 
and public recognition. Again, the paradox of hipsterism: the cate-
gorization is an insult, and it is loathed, and yet you still recom-
mended that coffee shop, and it is still always packed. 
I. WHITHER THE TECHNO-GIANTS? 
Tim Wu’s The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded 
Age, the latest in Wu’s series of history-minded books accessibly 
expounding on the dynamics of competition, does not once use the 
word “hipster.”17 All the same, its aim is to both defend and define 
the movement Wu would have called Neo-Brandeisianism; what 
its critics and the popular press call “hipster antitrust” 18 ; and  
what might more descriptively just be called progressive antitrust  
reform. This movement, now largely headquartered in the Open 
Markets Institute and catalyzed by Lina Khan’s skewering of  
Amazon’s corporate dominance in the Yale Law Journal, 19  is  
essentially built around the idea that antitrust law took a wrong 
turn when it focused the law’s inquiry into anticompetitive behav-
ior on whether a given action benefits or hurts consumer welfare—
that is, whether the behavior typically raises or lowers consumer 
prices.20 For instance, under the current state of the law, antitrust 
harms are theorized out of existence when a firm engages in “pred-
atory pricing” (setting the price below cost in order to drive com-
petitors out of the market)21 because, in Wu’s words, “that which 
did not exist in theory probably did not exist in practice,”22 and in 
the meantime consumers benefit from lowered prices.23 Instead, 
per Khan, the reformists argue that “gauging real competition in 
 
17 See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
(2018). 
18 See id.; see also supra Introduction. 
19 See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017). 
20 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
107–15 (1978). 
21 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, https://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/predatory-or-
below-cost [https://perma.cc/4ACB-LD6Q]. 
22 WU, supra note 17, at 107. 
23 See id. 
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the twenty-first century marketplace—especially in the case of 
online platforms—requires analyzing the underlying structure and 
dynamics of markets.”24 To compensate, antitrust analysis should 
“examine the competitive process itself,” rather than “pegging 
competition to a narrow set of outcomes.”25 
The Curse of Bigness, like Wu’s earlier books The Master 
Switch26  and The Attention Merchants, 27  proceeds with detailed 
portraits of key players—microbiographies personalizing the  
dynamics he is trying to capture. The epistemology here appears to 
be a variant on the aphorism about needing to look back to move 
forward: there are direct lessons for the present in the relatively 
recent past, regardless of how new and shiny our current circum-
stances feel. Nevertheless, while this newest installment does com-
plement Wu’s earlier works, even where it retreads some of the 
same ground, The Curse of Bigness is doing something quite  
different. Situated first and foremost in the current political and 
intellectual moment, this book’s defense of what Wu refuses to call 
hipster antitrust feels urgent. 
The history-first approach belies the thematic urgency, but Wu 
compensates for it with uncharacteristic brevity. The cast for Curse 
of Bigness is a focused one: Brandeis, the principled progressive;28 
Roosevelt, the mercurial trustbuster; John D. Rockefeller and John 
Pierpont Morgan, the vintage fatcats;29 Aaron Director and Robert 
Bork, monopoly’s apologists.30 These actors assemble neatly into 
the dialectic Wu is exploring as a partisan: those who expressly 
view antitrust as an inherently political arena, a necessary check on 
concentrations of power toxic to democracy; and those who view 
antitrust as a narrow tool best confined to very rarely remedying a 
very particular kind of economic wrong. Brandeis theorizes on the 
side of a political antitrust, and Roosevelt acts; Rockefeller and 
 
24 Khan, supra note 19, at 717. 
25 Id. 
26 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
17–32 (2010). 
27 See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR 
HEADS 11–23 (2017). 
28 See WU, supra note 17, at 34–44. 
29 See id. at 45–77. 
30 See id. at 78–92. 
1164        FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1157 
Morgan monopolize their way into a gilded age; Bork and Director 
build the theoretical groundwork for their return. 
The mini-biographical model works well here in part because 
the larger story Wu tells is about the life cycle of ideas: the  
circumstances that cause them to take root, the people who cham-
pion them, how they compete, win, and lose. Antitrust law’s origi-
nal and central text, the Sherman Act,31 “is so broadly worded and 
unclear in its application that it does not take real meaning or shape 
without an enforcement tradition,”32 leaving its meaning and prac-
tice largely contingent on the rise and fall of the ideas of the day. 
And this is really a story about how the Chicago school, primarily 
through the scholarship of Robert Bork,33 won the day and left us 
with an antitrust law affirmatively comfortable with monopoly 
power and willing to support its exercise in all but a very  
few ways. 
One way of understanding Bigness is as Wu picking up from 
where The Master Switch punted. In concluding that book, Wu 
wrote: 
To leave the economy of information, and power 
over this commodity, subject solely to the trad-
itional ad hoc ways of dealing with concentrations 
of industrial power—in other words, to antitrust 
law—is dangerous. Without venturing into the long, 
rancorous debate over what, if any, kind of antitrust 
policy is proper in our system, I would argue that by 
their nature, those particular laws alone are inade-
quate for the regulation of information industries.34 
The time has come, apparently, to weigh into the rancorous debate, 
and to come down firmly on the need for “big case” interventions. 
Why now? 
There need not be just one answer. When the hipsters come to 
gentrify your neighborhood, there are generally a number of fac-
tors at play—generational, cultural, financial. Similarly, no single 
 
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2018). 
32 WU, supra note 17, at 50–51. 
33 See generally BORK, supra note 21, at 405–07. 
34 WU, supra note 26, at 303–04. 
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reason explains why the current moment feels ripe for a turn to a 
more robust and populist understanding of antitrust. Dramatically, 
the darkness of the political scene sparks reminders of how indus-
trial consolidation abetted the rise of fascism in Europe.35 The suc-
cess of the Chicago school in the academy and on the bench, the 
paucity of muscular antitrust action from government, the increase 
in consolidation generally—all are motivating, and all are central 
themes of Wu’s book. However, the single greatest propellant has 
to be the highly visible, grokkable, everyday dominance of Big 
Tech: Google, for (at least) search; Amazon, for (at least) ecom-
merce; Facebook, for social media. These enterprises and their 
clout are so great that there is even a word for the phenomenon of 
growing popular discontent for the giants: “techlash.”36 
For a book with a palpable and timely political agenda, and one 
so deeply tied to popular concern over the “tech trusts,” written by 
the coiner of net neutrality and a theorist of the web, Wu manages 
to spend surprisingly little ink addressing tech’s role in the current 
moment—just a scant seven pages capping his broader tracing of 
antitrust history and concluding, unceremoniously, that “[i]f there 
is a sector more ripe for the reinvigoration of the big case tradition, 
I do not know it.”37 
If the existence of the popular techlash proves anything, it is 
that one does not need to expressly identify as a New Brandeisian 
to worry about the clout of today’s technology monopolists. The 
last handful of years has featured a steady drumbeat of books de-
crying the power, influence, and malfeasance (both documented 
and suspected) of big tech.38 Most of these do not focus on bigness 
 
35 At least, this is the history as Wu relates it. See WU, supra note 17, at 79–80. The 
adoption of a causal claim attributing Hitler’s rise to power, at least in part, to German 
industrial concentration has not gone undisputed. See, e.g., Alec Stapp, Tim Wu’s Bad 
History: Big Business and the Rise of Fascism, NISKANEN CTR. (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/big-business-rise-fascism-bad-history-tim-wu 
[https://perma.cc/X7ZV-6C62]. For my part, I think it is fair to think that mere 
correlation is sufficient cause for wariness when it comes to the incubation of fascism. 
36 See Word of the Year 2018: Shortlist, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxford
dictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/shortlist-2018 [https://perma.cc/KR5M-6VAH]. 
37 WU, supra note 17, at 126. 
38 WU, supra note 17, at 126; see also THREAT OF BIG TECH 11–12 (2017); see also 
generally JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, 
AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY (2017); ANDREW 
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first, but rather tend to target particular manifestations of corporate 
power. Indeed, bigness amplifies the potentially harmful impacts 
of activity that might otherwise appear somewhat remote from  
antitrust law. 
In copyright, for instance, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
the bigness of big technology is presently the driver of most of  
our major public policy debates. That is, the leading proposals 
presently on the table for reforming our copyright law—proposals 
that are proving to have legs, particularly in Europe where a new, 
tech-oriented copyright directive just recently passed39—emerge 
primarily from concerns about how both individual copyright  
owners and the culture industry are manhandled by the biggest 
technology players.40 These proposals represent a significant shift 
in regulatory approach. The early internet threat41  to copyright 
was, like the model of the early internet, largely a distributed one; 
the potential difficulty for copyright owners was straightforward 
and now very familiar—with everyone possessing networked  
copying devices (our computers and phones and other gizmos), 
everyone becomes a potential pirate of copyrighted work, limited 
only by individuals’ respect for, or fear of, the legal prohibition on 
sharing copyright-protected content. 
That dynamic of decentralization led to a decade characterized 
by industry lawsuits targeting individual infringers and countless 
millions of letters telling individuals to knock it off, and millions 
 
KEEN, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER (2015); ASTRA TAYLOR, THE PEOPLE’S 
PLATFORM: AND OTHER DIGITAL DELUSIONS (2014); JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE 
FUTURE? (2013). 
39 See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at 29, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 
14, 2016) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]. 
40 See Richard Smirke, European Union Passes Sweeping Copyright Reforms, Ending 
Safe Harbor for YouTube, BILLBOARD (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8504177/european-union-article-13-copyright-reforms-safe-harbor-
youtube-passage (framing the most controversial European reform as targeting YouTube 
specifically) (subscription paywall). 
41 I borrow the term from James Boyle though I use it here more loosely. See JAMES 
BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 54–82 (2008). 
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more directing intermediaries to remove suspect content.42 In the 
decentralized net, the leading copyright battles concerned how to 
best make an unruly public a rule-abiding one; or, from another 
perspective, how to maintain an effective copyright regime without 
threatening the generative potential of the network.43 Copyright 
industry groups have since mostly moved on44: business model 
realignments have been directed toward finding new equilibriums 
focused on lower-cost, library-scale, internet-mediated access to 
content, while industry has sharpened the focus of its ire toward 
the tech giants who hastened the change and appear to be wringing 
more benefit from this arrangement than the content industry 
browbeaten into it. 
To no small degree, this shift from a decentralized threat to a 
centralized one is an antitrust story—or a lack of antitrust story. In 
the heady early internet days, firms came and went, and the idea of 
lasting online dominance appeared illusory. But, by the mid aughts 
the ground had shifted. Per Wu, “[s]uddenly, there weren’t a dozen 
search engines, each with a different idea, but one search engine. 
There were no longer hundreds of stores that everyone went to, but 
one ‘everything store.’ And to avoid Facebook was to make your-
self a digital hermit.”45 While some of this growth might be best 
understood as the result of “superior skill, foresight, and indus-
try”46—the cunning and dynamism that has long convinced the 
courts to tolerate the resulting monopolies47—much of it was also 
simply the result of mergers and acquisitions that would have 
raised alarm bells in an earlier age. Facebook acquired WhatsApp 
 
42 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN 
THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) (in part reflecting on the legacy of these enforcement 
campaigns). 
43 Of course, opinions vary wildly as to what makes for an effective copyright regime. 
44 The “mostly” caveat here is important. Some segments of the copyright economy 
still target individual infringers as a matter of course, but this approach appears to survive 
more as a lucrative sideline for the pornography industry than as a concerted effort to 
shape behavior. See, e.g., Gabe Friedman, The Biggest Filer of Copyright Lawsuits? This 
Erotica Web Site, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/business/
currency/the-biggest-filer-of-copyright-lawsuits-this-erotica-web-site [https://perma.cc/
9VR8-QEM3]. 
45 WU, supra note 17, at 121. 
46 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
47 See, e.g., id. 
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and Instagram, the two leading upstart competitors in core areas of 
Facebook business.48 Google, struggling to capture market share 
with its Google Video service, simply acquired YouTube.49 
Let us consider YouTube. One way of understanding YouTube 
is as a host of user-submitted video. Users, of course, are the very 
same people previously at the pointy end of copyright infringement 
lawsuits, and their habits and knowledge of the liability landscape 
are not much changed. That is, users reliably post infringing mate-
rial on any platform to which they have access, perhaps with an 
accompanying “no infringement intended” caption. Making the 
business work despite rampant user misbehavior is the fact that 
YouTube benefits from the availability of a “safe harbor” under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act—essentially, YouTube and its 
parent company are shielded from liability for the copyright  
infringements of its users as part of the grand bargain Congress 
reached to ensure that service providers are able to exist at all to 
host user content.50 The tradeoff is that, to ensure safe harbor eligi-
bility, YouTube has to remove user-posted videos promptly after 
receiving notice from rightsholders.51 YouTube has been receiving 
and acting on52 these notices at considerable scale for much of  
its existence. 
If this were all YouTube was, it would—at this point any-
way 53 —be largely noncontroversial for copyright stakeholders. 
The notice-and-takedown balance does not exactly leave everyone 
 
48 See Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg Plans to Integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook 
Messenger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/
technology/facebook-instagram-whatsapp-messenger.html [https://perma.cc/B2Y5-
4EMS]. 
49 See Victor Luckerson, A Decade Ago, Google Bought YouTube—and It Was the Best 
Tech Deal Ever, RINGER (Oct. 10, 2016, 8:30 AM EDT), https://www.theringer.com/
2016/10/10/16042354/google-youtube-acquisition-10-years-tech-deals-69fdbe1c8a06 
[https://perma.cc/S4XW-HP6K]. 
50 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018). 
51 See id. § 512(c). 
52 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(describing YouTube’s compliance with large number of notices for clips in suit). 
53 It should go without saying that direct pushback against user-uploaded video hosts 
has very much been a thing, featuring flagship suits against YouTube and its competitors. 
See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022, 1022–23 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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happy (rightsholders do not consider the resulting whack-a-mole 
game to be a solution; user advocates balk at abuse of the 
takedown process), but it does not seem to break anything either. 
But YouTube is not merely a host of user-submitted video. For 
one thing, it is effectively the host for user-generated video—its 
particular combination of price point (i.e., free), visibility, and 
comprehensiveness has no peer. YouTube hoovers up hundreds of 
hours of video every minute, serves a monthly audience of roughly 
two billion logged-in users, and streams more than a billion hours 
of video per day.54 Alexa, the web metrics company and Amazon 
subsidiary, ranks YouTube as the world’s second most popular 
website.55 YouTube provides its simple-sounding service—video 
hosting—in a way that nobody else does and, given the operation’s 
scale, expense, lead-time, and comprehensiveness, nobody else 
likely can. 
Moreover, YouTube is a great deal more than just a host of 
“user-generated” video: it is also a leading provider of profession-
ally and semi-professionally made video, the world’s most popular 
music streaming service,56 and a cable company of sorts, providing 
access to a bundle of live television.57 It is impossible to forget that 
YouTube is also an Alphabet (that is, Google) subsidiary—a key 
part of the larger Google ecosystem and a close relative of that 
conglomerate’s other media efforts like its video store (Google 
Play Movies), music store (Google Play Music), and separate sub-
scription music streaming service (Google Music).58 
That YouTube is all of these things—enormous, vertically and 
horizontally integrated, dominant—is, of course, bound to have 
 
54 Press, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press [https://perma.cc/4UE3-
SR8S]. 
55 The Top 500 Sites on the Web, ALEXA, https://www.alexa.com/topsites [https://
perma.cc/L92Z-F9BV]. 
56 INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT REPORT 13 
(2018), https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/music-consumer-insight-report-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LN8N-3SHB]. 
57 YouTube TV, YOUTUBE, https://tv.youtube.com [https://perma.cc/QE3A-2DC9]. 
58 See Alejandro Alba, A List—from A to Z—of All the Companies, Brands Google's 
Alphabet Currently Owns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nydaily
news.com/news/world/z-list-brands-companies-google-alphabet-owns-article-1.2321981 
[https://perma.cc/5P8K-LLLW]. 
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visible effects in its relationship with the media industry that   
owns the rights to many high-value infringed materials. This is not 
simply a people-will-post-what-they-will situation where YouTube 
and rightsholder groups follow the statutorily provided path for-
ward. Instead, YouTube, at considerable expense, has developed 
Content ID—a system it uses to, well, identify content uploaded to 
its service.59  So, for example, if YouTube has a fingerprint of  
a given song or video, it can do a decent job of spotting uploads 
that incorporate the fingerprinted media.60 With that information, 
YouTube can prevent uploads from ever appearing, mute appar-
ently infringing audio, or monetize resulting advertising revenue to 
the rightsholder’s benefits.61 
Content ID is no silver bullet for the infringement problem. 
Representations about copyright ownership are inherently difficult 
to verify,62 meaning any effective implementation will probably 
limit access to sophisticated, larger, and more credible rights-
holders. Indeed, YouTube’s implementation does exactly that.63 
Yet, so long as the system is underinclusive of rightsholders,  
infringing content will continue to be uploaded and shared the way 
 
59 How Content ID Works—YouTube Help, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/S4GT-3PXA] [hereinafter YouTube 
Content ID]. 
60 This determination is necessarily subjective. Speaking for itself, YouTube calls 
Content ID “industry leading.” Manage Your Copyright on YouTube, YOUTUBE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20191118170127/https://creatoracademy.youtube.com/page/l
esson/copyright-management?cid=copyright&hl=en (archived link dated Nov. 18, 2019). 
61 See YouTube Content ID, supra note 59. 
62 This is a systemic characteristic flaw of the copyright system in general. Long-
lasting rights attach to protectable subject matter automatically by operation of law, and 
protectable subject matter is an expansive domain. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302 (2018). 
While the Copyright Office maintains a registration system and a recordation system for 
transfers, both are voluntary. See id. § 408(a). But see id. § 411(a) (stating that 
registration, or attempted registration, is necessary to commence a civil infringement 
action). Among the results of this state of affairs is that most everyone controls myriad 
copyright interests, but the credibility of any individual claim is often dubious. The most 
well-known upshot of this state of affairs is the phenomenon of “orphan works”—that is, 
protected works without an identifiable owner due to the lack of apparent rightsholder 
information or a murky chain of title. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ORPHAN 
WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2015), 
https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XQ8J-8KTD]. 
63 See YouTube Content ID, supra note 60. 
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it always has. Just as importantly, the metes and bounds of copy-
right’s exclusive rights are poorly suited to algorithmic interpreta-
tion.64 Infringing works can be so dissimilar from the originals  
as to escape detection, and noninfringing works can borrow 
enough from others as to throw flags, or otherwise their status as 
noninfringing can be dependent on context not available to the  
machine.65 YouTube works to correct the system’s tendency to-
ward underenforcement by providing less-powerful tools to those 
outside the Content ID system, 66  and to correct the tendency  
toward overenforcement by providing in-house dispute procedures 
for resolving complaints over wrongful Content ID-facilitated  
actions. Even though the system Google has developed would  
appear to realign the baseline in rightsholders’ favor, it is not a sys-
tem that, on balance, is going to make anyone very happy. 
As a result, Content ID is a powerful bargaining chip for 
YouTube in its dealings with rightsholders. YouTube is now infa-
mous among musicians and the larger recording industry for its 
low royalty rates relative even to its notoriously tightfisted compe-
tition67—and its edge makes good sense. YouTube, with its scale, 
can comfortably know that most anything that has been taken 
down will come back up. YouTube has, and will continue to have, 
an unparalleled library to draw from thanks to user uploads. 
Rightsholders, given the choice either to struggle against the tide 
using the statutory tools provided by the DMCA or to sign up for 
Content ID, have a clear incentive to use Content ID: use of the 
system offers worlds-more expedient and reliable identification of 
 
64 For instance, copyright doctrine recognizes both “literal” and “non-literal” 
infringements. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960). Literal copying is, typically, easy to recognize: protected expression is taken 
directly. Id. Non-literal infringement, where the copying at issue is in some way 
abstracted, is much trickier. Id. Complicating matters further, copyright limitations—
most notably fair use—have boundaries that are necessarily determined ad hoc. See, e.g., 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2015). 
65 See Copyright Management Tools—YouTube Help, YOUTUBE, https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/9245819 [https://perma.cc/F6CU-LEJW]. 
66 See id. 
67 See Daniel Sanchez, What Streaming Music Services Pay (Updated for 2018), 
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/01/
16/streaming-music-services-pay-2018 [https://perma.cc/QTH9-4VM4] (“Last year, at 
$0.00006 per play, [YouTube] had the worst artist revenue payouts.”). 
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infringing content, and more fine-grained control over how to  
respond to individual cases. The catch, of course, is that YouTube 
can leverage access to the tool—or possible uses of the tool—in its 
negotiations with rightsholders for licensed access to their content. 
The resulting arrangements are tightly controlled by nondisclo-
sure agreements, but it is clear that access to the full suite of  
Content ID’s features is both a carrot and a stick. When YouTube 
wants to expand into new areas, as when it set about building its 
music subscription service, for instance, the exchange appears to 
have been participation in the program—with complete catalogs—
or else the loss of monetization.68 Make some money YouTube’s 
way and at YouTube’s rates, or else make no money on YouTube 
at all. Either way, rightsholders’ content will still be there, or be 
coming back there soon. The same copyright carveout that makes 
YouTube possible as a host for user-generated content also arms 
the platform powerfully in its quest to serve a half dozen other 
roles as a provider of copyrighted work entirely distinct from that 
of a neutral intermediary. 
We can see this as a bigness problem or as a copyright prob-
lem—or perhaps, as no problem at all. If YouTube stood alone, or 
if it operated solely as a user-generated enterprise without ambi-
tions across parallel industries, or it were just smaller, the balance 
struck by the DMCA safe harbor would probably continue to work 
acceptably well, just as it does for most websites hosting user-
generated content. With bigness more or less off the table as a real-
istic target—and with many copyright industry players themselves 
potentially subject to attacks on bigness—it makes sense that 
YouTube’s critics in the traditional content industries have framed 
the issue as one of copyright law rather than one of antitrust. 
So now the European Union has adopted a new approach to the 
copyright responsibilities of online hosts of user content,69 one that 
appears targeted at YouTube first and foremost.70 In a major rever-
sal, this new directive will obligate hosts—with no meaningful 
 
68 See Zoë Keating, What Should I Do About Youtube?, TUMBLR (2015), 
https://zoekeating.tumblr.com/post/108898194009/what-should-i-do-about-youtube 
[https://perma.cc/46ZH-XLZ9]. 
69 See Commission Proposal, supra note 40, at 29. 
70 See Smirke, supra note 41. 
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carveouts for scale for most of them—to attempt to secure licenses 
for any material that might be uploaded and prevent the public 
availability of material identified by rightsholders.71 Put another 
way, the directive would make Content ID-like screening of  
uploads mandatory, while pressuring service providers to secure 
licenses from major rightsholders or rights management groups. 
Rightsholders will have automated screening technology work  
to augment their own bargaining power rather than that of online 
intermediaries. 
Nevertheless, the move can look bewildering on its surface: 
rightsholders’ concerns about YouTube’s clout are almost single-
handedly driving an effort to write into law a technical hurdle  
that would appear to make YouTube almost singularly competition 
proof. Yes, rightsholders would have more leverage over 
YouTube, but by imposing technical requirements that play dir-
ectly to YouTube’s strongest competitive advantage, they would 
help ensure that meaningful competition will be absent from this 
space for generations. 
The YouTube story evinces an arms-race solution to mono-
poly: in the face of overwhelming licensee market power, the  
copyright industry is turning to legislative means of acquiring 
more of their own. You may not be able to kill your giant, but you 
may yet be able to highjack, emulate, or piggyback on its domi-
nance. This is a remarkably brazen approach to antitrust harms: 
your monopoly power is too strong; the remedy is to increase my 
own or to share in some of yours. In the copyright-industry wars 
against the technology giants, this approach is now a common one: 
Amazon is a bully to publishers; publishers allied with Apple to fix 
prices, wanting to equal its bully’s power while maintaining access 
to its essential customer base.72 Google bullied its way into build-
 
71 See Commission Proposal, supra note 40, at 29 (known popularly as Article 13 
under the draft numbering). 
72 This particular cartel, crossing antitrust’s still-firm bar against price fixing, did draw 
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) attention, resulting in settlements from the publisher 
defendants and a loss in court for Apple. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 
296–97 (2d Cir. 2014). I have written about this case elsewhere. See generally Michael 
Wolfe, The Apple E-Book Agreement and Ruinous Competition: Are E-Goods Different 
for Antitrust Purposes?, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 129 (2014). Amazon, despite drawing 
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ing the world’s largest library of digital books73; publishers and 
authors used a copyright lawsuit to try and cement Google’s posi-
tion as the sole provider of out-of-commerce texts while taking a 
cut of the proceeds.74 Google is comfortably profitable and links 
individuals to news reporting while the news business flounders 
globally75; therefore, the news business advocates for—and secures 
in Europe—a new copyright-like press-publishers right that would 
entitle them to payment for these links.76 It is now awkwardly ap-
parent that many of the copyright industries’ giant-killers do not 
appear to be exactly sincere in their ambitions, looking at every 
turn more eager to make or to force a power-sharing deal than to 
strike a blow capable of making genuine change. 
Of course, the industrial titans of our new gilded age have 
made enemies in almost every sector of the economy, even if  
 
antitrust allegations over its practices in the book industry, has not faced a real antitrust 
challenge. See Khan, supra note 19, at 710. 
73 Google characterizes its Google Books project as the “world’s most com-
prehensive,” and there is no reason to disbelieve the claim. See Google Books, GOOGLE, 
https://books.google.com [https://perma.cc/6UNG-LM7M]. The collection was built, in 
large part, by the wholescale scanning of research library collections under a later-
vindicated theory that copyright law would not prevent the use. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2014). Today, the collection has more than 40 
million volumes. 15 Years of Google Books, GOOGLE (Oct. 17, 2019), https://
blog.google/products/search/15-years-google-books [https://perma.cc/957S-VETX]. 
74 The proposal took the form of a sweeping class action settlement that would have 
remade the market for older books. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book 
Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2011). The settlement was 
ultimately scuttled by the district court following sharp criticism by the public and the 
submission of Justice Department arguments about potential antitrust concerns. See 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The copyright suit 
and its twin—a case against Google’s library partners—ultimately resulted in a pair of 
remarkable fair use rulings that upheld the digitization effort as lawful. See generally 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013). 
75 See Google News, GOOGLE, https://news.google.com [https://perma.cc/P4WL-
N4RF]. While the relationship between online news aggregation and the decline of news 
reporting is a difficult one to untangle, traditional news reporting has contracted 
significantly in the internet era. See U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Dropped a Quarter 
Since 2008, with Greatest Decline at Newspapers, PEW RES. CTR. (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-
dropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008 [https://perma.cc/8RLC-QV7A]. 
76 The new European-wide press-publishers right is also found in the 2019 copyright 
directive. See Commission Proposal, supra note 40, at 29 (widely known as Article 11 
following the draft numbering). 
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the copyright industries stand out as being particularly aggrieved. 
In 2019, we all might have good reason to question the wisdom  
of YouTube’s bigness, or that of any of the technology giants. 
YouTube’s control over how videos are recommended or  
autoplayed shapes what we see and hear, and those choices—like, 
say, Facebook’s choices in what the newsfeed displays—have 
drifted toward providing toxic misinformation and conspiracy.77 
These are the Cheetos of information goods: glaringly and facially 
bad for you, yet still craved and loved by millions. No terribly 
compelling counteraction has been found to the incentives steering 
online intermediaries toward the serving of bad information, and—
particularly in the absence of workable answers—the idea that 
whatever solutions we have, whatever online media environment 
we receive, will most likely be the result of the secretive internal 
deliberations of a small handful of profit-seeking firms is one that 
should be frightening to any small-d democrat. 
But if bigness is readily apparent as a source of identifiable 
complaints, a tension remains between antitrust solutions to social 
problems and alternative piecemeal regulatory solutions. It is not at 
all clear that any of these problems should be solved by antitrust, 
and certainly most can be tackled through other means, just as 
YouTube’s clout with the copyright industries is addressable 
through changes to copyright law. Indeed, the key challenge issued 
by the consumer welfare standard’s defenders is that antitrust  
reformers naively view the antitrust laws (and/or antitrust reme-
dies) as a cure-all for a diverse set of much more specific problems 
that may or may not be best remedied by countering bigness per 
se—in the words of Wright et al., the hipsters advocate “antitrust 
regulation expansive enough to solve societal woes ranging from 
economic inequality to climate change.”78 
 
77 See generally Kevin Roose, YouTube Unleashed a Conspiracy Theory Boom. Can It 
Be Contained?, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/
technology/youtube-conspiracy-stars.html [https://perma.cc/7PBQ-98ME]; Alexis C. 
Madrigal, What Facebook Did to American Democracy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502 
[https://perma.cc/SC3C-CXNC]. 
78 Wright et al., supra note 7. 
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The truth is that law shapes markets from both the top-down 
(how we regulate market structure, with antitrust) and from the 
bottom-up (the ground rules we set for industries and businesses). 
It would be naive to think that one approach can solve all woes. 
Yet how do we determine ex ante where the more appropriate solu-
tion for a given problem lies? 
II. GRAPPLING WITH BORK’S LEGACY 
Robert Bork published The Antitrust Paradox more than forty 
years ago, crystallizing his ideas on antitrust into rules that have 
largely steered the law since. By now even Bork’s most sympa-
thetic readers, those keen to reign in the wilder antitrust enforce-
ment of the 1960s and give limiting principles and rigor to the 
field, would admit that the book’s approach is looking dated. Bork 
himself—taking aim at the earlier antitrust approaches and policies 
Wu would in part revive—aptly summed up the risk of reliance on 
mistakes, writing: “Wrong ideas, repeated often enough, lodge 
themselves in the culture as well as the law, and then proceed to 
expand according to their inner logic.”79 The stakes for the right-
ness or wrongness of Bork’s conception of antitrust are that, at this 
point in American antitrust’s history, no ideas have been repeated 
as often, or as influentially, as Bork’s. 
The most wrong idea Bork spawned here, for progressive anti-
trust reformers, is the foundational one: “The only legitimate goal 
of American antitrust law,” argues The Antitrust Paradox, “is the 
maximization of consumer welfare.”80  This standard contains a 
specific prescription for how antitrust law should consider cases 
(in practice, looking at the price effects of the activity in question), 
a limiting principle making this prescription exclusive, and is built 
on the theory that a famously vague law that had been otherwise 
interpreted for nearly three quarters of a century has nevertheless 
always required both adoption of this particular standard and the 
exclusion of others. 
 
79 BORK, supra note 20, at 420. 
80 Id. at 51. 
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It is possible to find wrongness here at several levels. Most 
fundamentally, one can question the value of consumer welfare as 
a yardstick, but there is a baby in that bathwater.81 Instead, the 
more profitable tack is to target the test’s exclusivity and its neces-
sity—to demand an antitrust law that may see the consumer wel-
fare standard supplemented, or perhaps in certain cases even  
supplanted, with other considerations as circumstances demand. 
Scholars and practitioners working within the post-Bork main-
stream may find this pushback puzzling, not because it is the law 
or its standards are beyond reproach, but rather because there may 
be room for reform within the confines of the prevailing tradition. 
Yes, Bork’s worldview is so narrow as to dismiss outside harms—
even if precipitated by activities squarely in antitrust’s wheel-
house—as “not antitrust issues,” and to conclude that these harms 
“must be taken care of by other laws.”82 Nevertheless, assuming 
either that Bork was right, or else that we have to pretend he was, 
does it really lead to the conclusions and limitations the Neo-
Brandeisians are chafing under? After all, we have an antitrust  
literature that purports to apply the standard with more depth than 
Bork was willing to allow that might provide for a more robust law 
within the confines of the existing approach. For antitrust, the 
promise of behavioral law and economics, of information econom-
ics, and of innovation economics is that given sufficient depth, we 
might more clearly and accurately recognize where market struc-
ture creates welfare problems that under more superficial analyses 
might otherwise fail to render fully.83 
Viewed charitably, Bork’s antitrust legacy can be read as  
a laudable kind of intellectual modesty. Legal interventions that 
offer treble damages, the power to break up big companies, or the 
imposition of perpetual government oversight over the market  
decisions of private actors may be necessary, but these are all  
notably powerful responses. Allowing for action of this sort with-
out fully understanding the stakes and the likely effects is danger-
 
81 See WU, supra note 17, at 135 (“While the tools of economics will always be 
essential to antitrust work, it is a disservice to the laws and their intent to retain such a 
laserlike focus on price effects as the measure of all that antitrust was meant to do.”). 
82 BORK, supra note 20, at 248. 
83 See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
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ous, the thinking goes, so putting action before theory is a cart-
before-horse kind of move. Welfarism is mercifully capacious: all 
the misleading references to “consumers” aside, what both Bork 
and modern antitrust care about is maximizing social welfare.84 
Utilitarians, at least, can feel comfortable with the target even if 
there is plenty of room to quibble with the methodology, and glad 
to see the law evolve with our understanding of how market struc-
ture and competitive processes affect welfare. There would be 
something appealing about this kind of intellectual modesty, if it 
were not paired with the jarring audaciousness of Borkean exclu-
sivity: by restricting all possible theories of harm to those under-
stood by a welfare analysis, the argument pairs its humble mantle 
of restraint with an imperial crown. Remember, princes: to pass as 
paupers, you are going to have to commit to completing the look. 
There ought to be a word—and perhaps there is, I don’t claim 
perfect knowledge here—for the use of an over-powered specialist 
tool to identify with care and precision the big, obvious thing that 
is right there in front of you.85 The Curse of Bigness wants first and 
foremost to make antitrust capable of dealing with the harms con-
solidation and monopoly can have for democracy, noting that “the 
struggle for democracy now and in the progressive era must be one 
centered on private power—in both its influence over, and union 
with, government.”86 For reformists, this is the big, obvious thing 
right in front of us all, and they have had enough of antitrust law 
puzzling over it with a microscope. Allowing that maybe we can 
craft a price-theory-driven antitrust law with a complexified 
awareness and treatment of irrational actors, imperfect knowledge, 
innovation, and market dynamism that is sufficiently well-tuned to 
see and speak to these other harms, how long can we wait for price 
effects to convincingly speak to principles of governance if in the 
meantime democracy is crumbling? 
 
84 See generally Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011) (exploring the confusion surrounding Bork’s 
“consumer welfare” nomenclature). 
85 If we adopt “economize” for the purpose, it would have the benefit of being a near 
autoantoynm, but I am sure there are many equally good candidates. 
86 WU, supra note 17, at 139. 
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It bears noting, however, that in The Antitrust Paradox “preda-
tion by abuse of governmental procedures” is expressly an antitrust 
harm, and one to which Bork is actually sympathetic.87 This makes 
sense: Bork’s ideology and economics (assuming the two are sepa-
rable) both caution against the evils of too-big government, so flip-
ping the script on antitrust to make it about the potential abuse of 
government power rather than the abuse of private power is a natu-
ral leap. The obvious solution from a Borkean perspective is a 
weaker government, and therefore, less opportunity for abuse. But 
recognizing the problem—that businesses can leverage their scale 
and power to use government as an anticompetitive weapon—also 
opens the door to the idea that private power at government-
shaping scale is insidious to the project of democratic governance. 
Again, even though understanding these potential harms in effi-
ciency or price terms is not necessarily impossible, why should we 
wait years for economists to squabble over inconclusive and con-
testable answers if there is a way to express them clearly in strictly 
political terms today? 
This kind of thinking will lead many antitrust scholars to view 
Wu’s book with—at best—irritation. The whole turn of modern 
antitrust after Bork and Director was to replace the massively  
inconsistent, economically dubious hodgepodge of case law with 
some judicially administrable standards and rules applied toward 
consistent and coherent economic ends.88 Yes, in the process, some 
of the political goals of the actual statutes themselves were to be 
given up—an ironic revolution to be started by Bork, a scholar 
who declared his undying fidelity to (constitutional) framers, but 
 
87 BORK, supra note 20, at 364. 
88 Wu does not pretend that pre-Chicago antitrust law was somehow free of these 
problems: his defense of earlier practice concedes the point some have viewed as going 
too far.  
It would be crazy, however, to defend every case that was brought as 
part of the big case tradition. For example, in the 1970s, the Federal 
Trade Commission went after the cereal industry based on the 
observation that it was profitable and somewhat concentrated. . . . 
The agency believed that product differentiation (that is, products 
aimed at children, older people, the health-conscious, and so on) was 
the anti-competitive tool of choice. To even describe the theory is to 
reveal its absurdity.  
WU, supra note 17, at 113–14. 
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made perhaps his biggest mark on the academy by encouraging 
scholars and the courts to ignore the intentions of (legislative) 
framers.89 Nevertheless, leaving aside the irony, antitrust scholars 
were right about the chaos and economic incoherence of the doc-
trine,90 and might rightly worry about the fate of the decades of 
work done since to at least try and right it. To have a critic arrive 
and urge us to focus once again on political economy, on bigness’ 
costs to innovation and democracy, may seem like the worst kind 
of backpedaling. 
Moreover, antitrust scholars—notably including many who 
have a less robust faith in the self-policing capacity of markets 
than Bork and Director—could argue that antitrust law and schol-
arship are already doing what Wu calls for, albeit in a more disci-
plined way. Antitrust law does look at the dangers of government 
cooptation and, as the Bork quotation above suggests, has done so 
throughout the modern era.91 There have also been thoughtful dis-
cussions of the tradeoff between short-run efficiency and long-term 
innovation,92 and the need to chasten muscular neo-classical eco-
nomics with more critical approaches that draw on traditions such 
as behavioral economics93 or institutional economics.94 
 
89 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143–60 (1997). Of 
course, the inconsistency is not one Bork himself would have acknowledged. Bork argues 
in Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act that his own reading of antitrust 
law is, in fact, the only faithful interpretation of the legislation—a position that strains 
credulity and Bork’s own source material. See WU, supra note 17, at 87–88, 89 (quoting 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989)). 
90 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
91 Consider, for instance, the long—if tellingly inconclusive—back and forth on how 
antitrust should incorporate and respond to state capture. See generally John T. Delacourt 
& Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of 
Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075 (2005); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism 
and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1293 (1988); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986). 
92 See generally, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 247 (2007). This literature is certainly not lost on Wu, given his contributions to it. 
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation 
Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 313 (2012). 
93 Behavioral economics have of course served as a leading counterbalance to the 
assumptions made across the spectrum of fields where law and economics have been 
influential, and antitrust is no exception. See Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral 
Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573, 576–77 n.7 (2014) (collecting scholarly literature). But 
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To put the two critiques together, antitrust scholars might say, 
“you are throwing away all we have achieved in this attempt  
to turn back to messy, intuitive political economy, when we are 
actually well aware of the dangers you cite, and have accounted for 
them in various sophisticated ways.” This is, in one sense, a fair 
critique. Wu does not do a deep dive into the economics and  
econometrics of modern antitrust law. Nor does he stress the dan-
gers of incoherent, “I know it when I see it” antitrust enforcement. 
Point taken. In another sense, this critique misses Wu’s argument 
at a fundamental level—that antitrust, including current antitrust, is 
always already political in its choices. Economics provides no  
escape from those value choices, it merely picks one desirable  
value (consumer welfare) from an abundant normative basket. 
Moreover, antitrust is not just about theory; it is about  
enforcement, the inevitable need to rank and prioritize a hierarchy 
of values. The original Brandeisian movement was prompted by a 
political urgency, a call to action because both market and polity 
were being disfigured by the trusts.95 The behavioralist, innova-
tion, and institutionalist epicycles that recent scholars have added 
to antitrust’s orrery96 do indeed parallel some of Wu’s concerns, 
though at a third, fourth or fifth remove from the efficiency calcu-
lus.97 Wu, however, like the Brandeisians, is saying that our time 
 
see Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against 
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1517 (2012) (finding behavioral 
economics traditions “irrelevant” for antitrust analysis and not providing cause for a more 
interventionist antitrust policy). 
94 Oliver Williamson, coiner of “new institutional economics,” OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: A STUDY IN THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 
(1983), was, notably, motivated in his antitrust work by frustration with the lack of 
economic rigor seen in his experience as a Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust in the late 1960s. See Carl Shapiro, A Tribute to Oliver 
Williamson: Antitrust Economics, 52 CAL. MGMT. REV. 138, 138–39 (2010). While those 
contributions and those of following works are consistent with skepticism of pre-Chicago 
antitrust methodology, they also provide nuanced results that can be at odds with the 
Borkean neo-classical baseline. See Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, 
Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 95, 97 (2002) (“[T]ransaction 
cost economics [TCE] . . . may lead to different conclusions from mainstream approaches 
that ignore TCE considerations.”). 
95 See WU, supra note 17, at 38. 
96 See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
97 My thanks to James Boyle for assisting with this metaphor. 
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calls for a different vision in which those concerns are at the cen-
ter, not the periphery. He is also saying that contemporary reality 
and contemporary enforcement practice give ample evidence that 
those concerns are indeed at the periphery. He may be eliding 
some of the subtleties of contemporary antitrust scholarship, or  
the virtues of its goals but, if they miss that crucial dimension, the 
critics of Wu’s work are missing his point. 
CONCLUSION 
The history Wu recounts demonstrates that ideas, ably wielded 
in the right moment and aptly tailored to their institutional context, 
can be powerfully transformative—in the case of antitrust, helping 
outline the shape and structure of our economy, with all the knock-
on effects that come with that kind of high-level tinkering. Today, 
there is no doubt that we are currently in a moment where another 
inflection in the history of antitrust is possible. The size, visibility, 
and rancor of the debate is a testament to the stakes and to the tan-
gibility of the opportunity. The present debate is one of those rare 
moments, like those Wu traces, where ideas can be operationalized 
and powerful. There is a reason for the name calling: there is some-
thing to see here. 
Demonstrating the possibility of change and charting the path 
ahead, however, are not the same thing. To move their agenda  
forward, the ideas challenge-antitrust reformers have are two-fold:  
(1) to convincingly undermine antitrust’s reigning idea—the pre-
eminence of the consumer welfare standard—and (2) to outline a  
substitute vision of the future. At every turn, the first part of the 
challenge has been easier. Critics can easily point out harms that 
are clearly about bigness but that the consumer welfare standard 
seems to miss. They can offer histories that provide better explana-
tions for the law’s intent. They can take potshots at the economic 
theory, and the application of economic theory, that undergirds the 
status quo. The work that The Curse of Bigness does is primarily of 
this sort. 
When it comes to offering an alternative vision, the move-
ment—and Wu—struggles. Not in absolute terms, mind you; they 
have plenty of ideas to offer, and Wu’s proposed standard is as 
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good as any. Quoting Brandeis, he would have the courts ask 
“whether the targeted conduct is that which ‘promotes competition 
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion,’”98 which has the virtues of a good pedigree and a focus on 
process over outcome. Recognizing that antitrust is and has always 
been political, for reformists, is meant to be liberating. For them, 
antitrust can do the abstract work of protecting democratic institu-
tions, countering inequality, and promoting free speech values pre-
cisely because these are things that bigness and monopoly threaten, 
and antitrust is a body of law that can and has challenged, over-
seen, and dismantled bigness and monopoly. 
For the establishment, however, all of these concepts are dan-
gerously under-specified, and amount to giving the government 
carte blanche to go after corporate enemies with only the most 
minimal of limiting principles. It might be difficult to imagine a 
dangerously unhinged, capricious, and vindictive executive, but try 
to picture such a thing, and then hand it a newly empowered and 
political antitrust. Specificity and rigor need not entail the con-
sumer welfare standard, but critics have a straightforward case to 
make about their importance. 
So the most powerful rebuttal to Wu’s view—the one  
employed most often and the most credibly by critics of the pro-
gressive reformist movement99—is simply that there is not any-
thing here to provide a workable and consistent methodology. You 
may not like consumer welfare as a yardstick, but it at least looks 
like something we can measure against or at least theorize about 
using the tools we have at our disposal.100 Wu does not, and proba-
bly cannot, counter that notion. 
The disagreement between Wu and his critics reflects a conflict 
that runs far deeper than just antitrust: the appeal of rules that seem 
possible to consistently and clearly apply is a real one in any  
 
98 WU, supra note 17, at 136. 
99 See, e.g., Wright et al., supra note 7, at 313. 
100 Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 526, 527 (1979) 
(reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(1978)) (“Too often, other [non-efficiency] goals [for antitrust law] are vaguely stated 
and invoked uncritically, with the result that such goals are not meaningfully promoted 
by proposals that purport to have beneficial effects of a non-efficiency kind.”). 
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debate, even when their evenhandness or clarity or ability to work 
justice is more fiction than fact. This is Robert Bork’s superpower 
and most lasting legacy in- and outside of antitrust: the ability to 
craft rules that, between their clarity and exclusiveness, stifle com-
peting ideas. Methodological pluralism, balancing tests, and con-
cerns about abstract or indirect consequences are much harder to 
justify or explain when your competition offers the simplicity of a 
single, clear, and exclusive rule, along with a single, clear, and  
exclusive understanding of the harm at stake. To make their ideas 
win, reformists will need to pull judges away from a clear test built 
to look apolitical—though inaction is never apolitical—to an  
unclear one that embraces an antitrust that is essentially political. 
This will not be an easy road to walk. 
The reformist movement has identified its moment and voiced 
its complaint. All eyes are on it. Can it deliver? To the extent the 
label provides insight here, it is worth noting that another element 
of hipsterism’s paradox lies in the term’s applicability to both  
passing fads and moments of genuine upheaval in the cultural bed-
rock. The antitrust story as Wu relates it is about powerful ideas, 
advanced by passionate advocates, taking root in “the culture as 
well as the law.”101 The ingredients are all here, now; one would 
need to be historically blinkered to think they cannot make this 
moment one of real change. 
 
 
101 BORK, supra note 20, at 420; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
